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Why People are Committed to Human Rights
and Still Tolerate Their Violation: A Contextual
Analysis of the Principle–Application Gap
Christian Staerkle´1 and Alain Cle´mence2
We report results from two experimental studies that show a large gap between
support for general principles contained in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and denunciation of concrete violations of these principles. Participants in
both studies read different scenarios involving human rights violations committed
by various authorities in Western contexts. In all situations, attributes or actions
of the victims could be used to justify the violations. Participants indicated their
level of support for each human right and the unacceptability of violations of it.
A dual principle was found to organize positioning towards the violations: par-
ticipants with a rights-based orientation denounced the violation independently
of the victims’ attributes, whereas context-oriented respondents relied on the per-
ceived deservingness of victims and considered the violation a just sanction of
an unacceptable act. Judgmental differences were moderated by the situational
context and participants’ extent of agreement with human rights.
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One of the puzzling concerns in the social justice domain is the gap between
the widespread endorsement of general legal principles and the equally common
tolerance of concrete violations of these principles. This is particularly true for
the principles of human rights. When human rights are invoked to regulate social
relations within particular contexts, they lose a great deal of their prescriptive
power. Their rather abstract and general formulation gives rise to conflicting
interpretations of the limits of application of human rights. A case in point concerns
the recent discussions about the treatment granted to suspected terrorists who are
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held in secretive army bases. Should they be treated according to the same legal
principles that apply to other individuals charged with a crime, or should the
gravity of their suspected activities be reason enough to bypass legal protection
such as the Geneva Convention?
In this paper, we explore these questions by examining how lay persons
uphold human rights principles when they are confronted with concrete events
involving rights violations. We investigate the role of human rights in common
thinking because they are based on the principle of universalism. Human rights
are a powerful normative device precisely because they are, at least by intention,
inalienable. Hence, they should be applied across different contexts without con-
sideration of any attributes of victims of human rights violations which could be
used to justify exceptions to fair and equal treatment (e.g., their suspected terrorist
activities).
If in the judicial context rights and procedures are indispensable to achieve
fair outcomes, in everyday life rights are frequently detached from formally
codified procedures applied by legal institutions (Cle´mence and Doise, 1995;
Miller, 2001; Skitka, 2002; Skitka and Houston, 2002). The just world belief
(Lerner, 1977) illustrates neglect of procedural consideration in lay judgments
of reprehensible acts. This belief exemplifies everyday justice thinking, which
is practiced without much concern for the rights of persons. Instead, perceived
deservingness of individuals determines to what extent individuals should be en-
titled to fair and good treatment. If victims of unfair treatment are perceived as
undeserving, they are easily derogated and rejected (Feather, 1999), even when
they are innocent (Hafer, 2002). Therefore, violations should be more easily
tolerated when the violation can be considered a just sanction for an unac-
ceptable act. Crandall and Beasley (2001) neatly summarized this tautological
lay logic: “Good people deserve good treatment, and bad people deserve bad
treatment.”
Thus, in everyday thinking, people become unconcerned with how justice
is achieved, as long as it is achieved. Commitments to fair procedures destined
to protect people from arbitrary treatment become eroded, because individuals
follow contextual norms rather than formal norms destined to protect individuals
from mistreatment by authorities (Darley, 2002). In this way, rights of persons
are neglected and exceptional characteristics of the victims or their acts are used
to construct fairness judgments (Nisbett and Ross, 1980). Outside the courtroom,
for example, people may tolerate violations of the right to a court hearing when
that right is insistently claimed by a person confined in a psychiatric institution.
Similarly, people may show acceptance of degrading treatment applied to terrorists
(Bechlivanou et al., 1990; Doise, 2002). Thus, individuals have recourse to norms
of justice that favor sanctions of victims while protecting authorities committing
the violations. By taking into account the context of a human rights violation,
individuals tend to give more credit to the efficient functioning of governmental
authorities than to the respect of civil rights (Crandall and Beasley, 2001). Because
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such lay reasoning is more concerned with the protection of the existing social
order and its authorities than with the upholding of the principle of fair treatment,
it also supports system justification (Jost and Banaji, 1994).
The gap between endorsement of rights principles and attitudes towards their
concrete implementation is thus explained by the fact that individuals activate
contextual norms of justice more easily than norms of procedural rights (Van den
Bos, 2003). Recent research shows that neglect of procedural information is most
likely to occur when social comparison information or other reference points are
available in the judgmental context (Skitka and Houston, 2002; Van den Bos and
Lind, 2002).
While it is plausible that lack of knowledge of legal procedures promotes to
some extent the activation of context-based judgments of human rights violations,
it seems more appropriate to view the gap between support for general principles
and tolerance of particular violations as an ideological dilemma opposing two sides
that may be perceived as equally legitimate (Billig, 1989; Emler, 2003). On the
one hand, individuals may defend the necessity of respecting formally established
rights irrespective of the particular circumstances, and on the other hand they
may advocate punishment of offenders and protection of innocents from potential
wrongdoers. This situation reflects a conflict between two justice norms, one that
consists in sanctioning reprehensible acts (context-based principle), and one that
is concerned with the protection of the rights of the person who has committed
them (rights-based principle). This dilemma will increase with the degree of
rejection of the victims of the human rights violation, that is, the more the victim’s
acts are objectionable, the more people will be inclined to tolerate violations. In
order to apply a rule that is consistent with universalistic human rights principles,
individuals must cognitively dissociate the violations from the victim’s acts. That
is, they must believe that the condemnation of the victim’s acts should not be used
to restrain his or her rights.
Human Rights in Context
The general prediction of the two studies reported here is that the level of
adherence to principles of human rights should be uniformly high, whereas con-
demnations of violations should vary as a function of the context in which these
violations occur and are reported. Three strategies were used to investigate the sta-
bility of human rights principles across different contexts. In the first experiment,
we varied the type of victim of the same forms of mistreatment by authorities. If
respondents do not take into account contextual information, and instead apply
the same procedures to both types of victims, then the human rights violation
should be equally condemned in both contexts. On the other hand, if respondents
do take into account the context of the violations, the severity of condemnations
of violations should be stronger when victims of these violations are judged as
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deserving good treatment. In this case, the context is expressed by taking into
account personal characteristics of the violation victim or the severity of his or her
acts, because these determine perceived deservingness.
A second strategy to operationalize context consists in varying the commu-
nicative context. Violations are rarely directly observed, but are instead conveyed
through the media. It is therefore important to analyze how the framing (e.g.,
Nelson and Kinder, 1996; Sears, 1993) affects the meaning associated with vi-
olations. In order to address this question, we manipulated in both studies the
indications given to the participants about the scope of the research. Each study
was either presented as a study on “human rights” or on ordinary “news events.”
Two alternative hypotheses were tested. On the one hand, the reference to human
rights should emphasize the positive and universalistic meaning attributed to such
rights. As a result, rights violations should be less tolerated. On the other hand, the
opposite prediction is also plausible: in the West, judgments in terms of human
rights are generally reserved for massive violations occurring “elsewhere” (e.g.,
deportations, disappearances, torture). Hence, they tend to be easily bypassed in
the case of local and particularistic events (e.g., unlawful arrest, expulsion of asy-
lum seekers). Because we are studying relatively local situations, violations could
be judged as more acceptable when they are framed as human rights reports. Using
a range of different scenarios, we will identify those contexts in which a reference
to human rights exerts a positive impact on judgments.
Finally, in Study 2, a third approach to the contextualization of rights will
be employed. We created an individual difference measure to distinguish between
individuals who justify the legitimacy of some human rights violations by taking
into account the contextual characteristics of the victim from those who defend
the rights of victims, irrespective of the context of the violation.
These questions were investigated by analyzing judgments concerning con-
crete human rights violations as regularly reported in news media. These scenarios
describe human rights violations committed by authorities, including the police,
the government, political parties, law courts, army officers, and schoolteachers.
The general objective was to test the robustness of human rights commitments
when individuals are confronted with concrete violations. We expect individu-
als to be inclined to disregard to varying degrees their convictions in matters of
(human) rights when they are qualified by exceptional circumstances.
STUDY 1
The aim of Study 1 was to examine the strength of the condemnation of human
rights violations in a communicative context either referring to a study about news
events or about human rights. Moreover, we varied the type of victim for the
same human rights violations. Endorsement of various human rights principles
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and condemnation of concrete violations were then compared, and the difference
between these two measures was used as an indicator of the principle-application
gap. We then assessed the stability of the condemnation of violations in different
experimental settings and across five concrete situations in which human rights
violations were described.
Method
Participants
One hundred and seventy-two pupils (105 females and 67 males) ranging in
age from 14 to 16 years, attending 8th and 9th grades at a secondary school in
Geneva participated in the experiment. Six participants were removed from the
analysis because they failed to complete the entire questionnaire.
Procedure
Participants completed a questionnaire during regular class time. The intro-
duction manipulated the first experimental variable by referring to the study as
being about “the views people have on human rights” or “the views people have on
news items.” Afterward, participants received a brief description of five scenarios,
each containing a real or potential violation of a human right as defined by the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) and by the two international
covenants concerning Civil and Political Rights (CPRC) and Social Economical
and Cultural Rights (SECRC). The issues described concerned the prohibition of
inhumane treatment, right to asylum, right to free primary schooling, right to invi-
olability of privacy, and interdiction of death penalty for minors. The victims of the
violations were either individuals who committed reprehensible acts (in the cases
of inhumane treatment, violation of privacy and death penalty) or individuals who
petitioned for a legitimate cause (the violation of the right to free schooling and
refusal of asylum). For each scenario, two vignettes were created in order to vary
the type of violation victim (for the exact wording of the vignettes see Table I).
The difference between judgments of two types of violation victims indicates that
judgments of identical violations are moderated by perceived characteristics of
the perpetrators. A pre-test established the perceived gravity of violations and
made it possible to balance the two final questionnaire variants. Participants were
invited to indicate to what extent they considered unacceptable (seven-point scale,
1: acceptable, 7: unacceptable) effective or potential right violations; similarly,
they evaluated the behavior or the situation of the violation victims. They also es-
timated the frequency of such scenarios on a seven-point scale (1: rarely, 7: often)
and the availability of sufficient information to form an opinion (1: insufficient, 7:
sufficient).
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Table I. News Items (Human Rights Violations) Used in Study 1, with Victim Type
News item 1: No interference with privacy
V1 : Drug traffic, V2: Shoplifter
Thursday at 7 a.m., the police searched, without a warrant, the house of a young woman
suspected of heroin trafficking (shoplifting). After a meticulous search, the police found
some proof of the offense.
Violation of human right: Home search without a warrant
Art. 12 UDHR: No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference with his privacy, family,
home or correspondence, nor to attacks upon his honor and reputation. Everyone has the
right to the protection of the law against such interference or attacks.
News item 2: Free elementary schooling
V1: Immigrant children, V2: Handicapped children
In order to reduce the educational budget, a political party has requested the suppression of
free primary schooling for certain children. This measure could be applied to immigrant
(handicapped) children.
Violation of human right: Suppression of free schooling
Art. 26.1 UDHR: Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the
elementary and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical
and professional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be
equally accessible to all on the basis of merit.
News item 3: Political asylum
V1: Algerian opponent, V2: Chinese opponent
Swiss government has refused asylum to an Algerian (Chinese) opponent and has
immediately deported him. Swiss government has argued that the request was unjustified
because the life of the man was not in danger in his country.
Violation of human right: Refusal of asylum
Art. 14.1 UDHR: Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries asylum from
persecution.
News item 4: Life
V1: Murder, V2: Rape
After a lengthy deliberation, an American court has sentenced a 17-year-old man to death.
The young man was found guilty of the murder of a 45-year-old man (of the rape of a
5-year-old girl).
Violation of human right: Death penalty
Art. 3 UDHR: Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person.
News item 5: No inhumane treatments
V1: Soldiers, V2: Pupils
Several young soldiers (pupils) have complained about corporal punishments inflicted by
some officers of the Swiss army (teachers in a Swiss school). The recruits (pupils) testified
that officers (teachers) did not hesitate to kick or, more seriously, to use electric shocks for
punishing those who refused to comply with an order (request).
Violation of human right: Inhumane and degrading treatment
Art. 5 UDHR: No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhumane or degrading
treatment or punishment.
Participants then received the second part of the questionnaire booklet that
started with a list of the five human rights alluded to in the scenarios. They first
indicated their degree of agreement with each of the five rights. In a free recall
task, participants were instructed to write down the rights and the scenarios they
judged in the first part of the questionnaire. The aim of this task was to check to
what extent participants established a connection between each scenario and the
corresponding human right.
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Results
Association Between Human Rights and Scenarios
Results of the recall task were first analyzed to check the relevance of par-
ticular human rights to judge concrete situations. Results show that, on average,
57% of the participants connected a scenario to the human right evoked by the sce-
nario and 10% associated it with another human right. The context of the scenario
moderated the recall. Thus, right to life was associated with the death penalty sce-
nario by 54% of the participants when it concerned a murderer, and only by 25%
(X2(1) = 13.77; p < .0005) when a rapist was involved. Similarly, interdiction
of inhumane treatment was associated with the corresponding scenario by 65%
of participants when soldiers were involved and by 45% in the school context
(X2(1) = 6.07; p < .05). Finally, right to asylum was associated with the asylum
scenario by 84% of the participants when a Chinese dissident was involved, and
by only 69% for an Algerian member of the opposition (X2(1) = 4.29; p < .05).
Judgments of Human Rights as Principles and as Concrete Violations
In order to assess the principle-application gap, we compared unacceptability
ratings of the violations evoked in the scenarios with the level of adherence to
the corresponding rights. Not surprisingly, results show that participants adhered
almost without reservation to the rights proclaimed in the UDHR (all M > 5.50).
Their disapproval of the concrete violations of these rights, however, was less clear-
cut (all M < 4.75; all t(165) > 7.90; all p < .0001). One remarkable exception
concerned the prohibition of torture and inhumane treatments: the condemnation of
this violation (M = 6.77) was stronger than the agreement with the corresponding
right (M = 6.23).
Unacceptability of the (Actions of the) Victims of Violations
Unacceptability ratings of the victims’ violations (i.e., their action or their
request) were submitted to an analysis of variance with the two experimental
factors (Reference: human rights vs. news items × Victim Type: variant 1 vs.
variant 2) as sources of variation. This analysis was conducted in order to check
the effect of the two different contexts introduced by the variant of the victim
type scenario. Condemnation of rape (M = 6.51) appeared to be stronger than
condemnation of murder (M = 5.09; F (1, 165) = 38.26; p < .001) in the con-
text of the death penalty. No statistically significant differences appeared in the
comparison of means according to victim type for the other scenarios. No main or
interaction effects involving scenario framing were significant. However, it must
be noted that the actions described in three out of five scenarios (murder/rape,
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drug traffic/shoplifter, free schooling for immigrant/handicapped children) were
clearly rejected (all M > 4.09). In the two remaining situations, the actions (asy-
lum request of an Algerian/Chinese opponent, disobedience of soldiers/pupils)
were not condemned (all M < 3.37).
Unacceptability of Violations
In this analysis, we evaluated the extent to which the two forms of context
manipulated in this experiment moderated the condemnation of human rights
violations. For each scenario, a 2 × 2 (Reference × Victim Type) ANOVA was
performed on the unacceptability judgments of concrete violations. In order to
control for the effects of attitudes towards human rights in general, acceptance of
the right corresponding to the scenario was introduced as a covariate. Similarly,
we controlled for the effects of the association between the human right and the
corresponding scenario in the recall task. Sex and school section of the participants
had no statistical effects, and were not further investigated.
Results reveal no interaction effects in the entire set of analyses. The two
experimental factors explained a significant part of the variance on the judgments
of the violations of three scenarios: death penalty, home-search without a warrant,
and suppression of free primary schooling (Table II). Inspection of the detailed
analyses shows that condemnation of the death penalty is stronger when the victim
committed a murder rather than a rape (F (1, 165) = 18.07; p < .001) and when
the reference concerned News items rather than Human rights (F (1, 165) = 10.11;
p < .005). Regarding privacy violation, the condemnation of the search without
a warrant was more severe when the person was suspected of stealing than when
the person was alleged to deal drugs (F (1, 165) = 8.64; p < .01). Reference
to Human rights moderated the condemnation of the violation in comparison
with the News item reference (F (1, 165) = 8.05; p < .01). The suppression of
primary school gratuity again was judged as less unacceptable in the Human rights
condition (F (1, 165) = 10.00; p < .005). The main effect of the victim type was
Table II. Mean Condemnation of the Violations by Reference (Study Frame) and Type of Victim
of The Violation
Reference Victim type
News Right V1 V2
Human rights violation (n = 86) (n = 80) (n = 83) (n = 83)
Death penalty for a minor 4.66 3.73 4.89 3.55
Home-search without warrant 4.89 4.12 4.11 4.92
Suppression of free schooling 5.28 4.17 4.47 5.04
Refusal of asylum 4.36 4.42 4.24 4.54
Inhumane treatmen 6.75 6.78 6.76 6.77
Note: Scale: 1: acceptable, 7: unacceptable; see Table I for the definition of V1 and V2.
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weaker (F (1, 165) = 4.10; p < .05): participants more strongly condemned the
violation when victims were handicapped rather than immigrant children. The
two experimental variables had no impact on the evaluation of the rejection of
an Algerian or Chinese asylum-seeker (Fs < 1) and on the condemnation of the
violation of the inhumane treatment interdiction (Fs < 1).
Effects of covariates showed that a higher agreement with human rights
principles enhanced the condemnation of the violation in three cases: death penalty
(F (1, 165) = 6.32; p < .05), refusal of asylum (F (1, 165) = 10.14; p < .005),
and inhumane treatment (F (1, 165) = 11.55; p < .001). An unexpected inverse
relationship was found for the case of privacy violation (F (1, 165) = 5.32; p <
.05). A non-significant increase of condemnation was observed for all scenarios
when participants correctly associated principles and concrete violations.
Discussion
Results confirm that general human rights principles are almost consensu-
ally endorsed, whereas concrete violations of these same principles are, at least
to some extent, tolerated. Thus, the high level of agreement with institution-
ally defined rights drops when such a right is concretely or potentially violated.
However, a remarkable exception to this pattern concerns the principle of pro-
hibition of inhumane treatment that participants seem to apply in a consistent
way to concrete facts. In the present case the consensual adherence to this right
would confirm its inscription in the central core of human rights (see Amnesty
International, 1992, p. 68). It should be noted, however, that one cannot exclude
the possibility that this finding would be due to the specific events studied in
this investigation, and that participants would give up their formal adherence
when confronted with individuals having committed more reprehensible acts than
the mere refusal to comply with an order or a request. Yet, judgments of this
violation were not moderated by any variable other than the adherence to the
right itself, a finding that confirms the significance attributed to this right by
participants.
Judgments of three violations (death penalty, home search, suppression of
free schooling) were moderated by the two contextual variables, that is, the char-
acteristics of the violation victim and the frame of reference in which violations
are presented. It must be emphasized that the rejection of violation victims was
strongest in these three scenarios. Therefore, the dilemma between the endorse-
ment of rights principles and the legitimacy of the rights violation was strongest
in these cases. The murderer, the thief, and the handicapped person seemed more
acceptable (or less unacceptable) and deserving better treatment than the rapist, the
drug dealer and immigrant. Hence, sanctions against the former were more firmly
rejected than sanctions against the latter. It is interesting to note that, contrary to
the judgments of the rights violations committed by authorities, judgments of the
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victim’s acts varied only slightly across the different variants (except for the death
penalty scenario). This suggests that judgments of human rights violations are
more prone to contextual reasoning than are judgments of the victims’ actions.
When the object of study was presented as dealing with news items rather
than with human rights issues, more severe condemnations of rights violations
were observed for the same three scenarios discussed above (death penalty, home
search, suppression of free schooling). This intriguing effect suggests that under
some circumstances it is counterproductive to argue in terms of human rights,
because this paradoxically seems to increase rather than decrease tolerance of
violations. Although it is not possible to draw any firm conclusions about this
effect, our results indicate that such framing effects are likely to develop when
the moral dilemma between the endorsement of the general principle and the
acceptance of the violation is strong, that is, when individuals have good reasons
to dislike or disrespect violation victims.
Results support the general claim that two forms of reasoning can be distin-
guished in judgments of daily human rights violations in a dilemma situation. A
rights-oriented principle is used when the context of judgment induces participants
to dissociate the two sides of the dilemma and a context-oriented principle is at
work when they consider the violation by authorities to be a fair sanction of an
unacceptable act.
STUDY 2
Study 2 examined more directly the hypothesis that rights- vs. context-
oriented principles in judgments of human rights violations could be activated.
This was accomplished by measuring the first reaction participants expressed fol-
lowing a human rights violation. We reasoned that participants whose statements
reflected a denunciation of the violation (a rights-oriented principle) should con-
demn more firmly the violations than those who associated the violation with a fair
sanction of an unacceptable act (i.e., a context-oriented principle). Furthermore,
the same experimental induction manipulating the communicational context was
used. Characteristics of the human rights victims, however, were no longer varied.
Method
Participants
Eighty-eight pupils ranging in age from 16 to 20 years (48 females and 40
males) from a high school in the French-speaking part of Switzerland participated
in the experiment. They belonged to three grades of two academic sections. Two
participants were removed from the analyses because they failed to complete the
entire questionnaire.
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Procedure
The questionnaire, similar to the one used in Study 1, was presented to
participants on a personal computer and was created with Authorware software.
The beginning of the questionnaire introduced the first experimental variable:
the study was randomly presented as either a Study on News Items or a Study
on Human Rights. In both conditions, participants read that the study dealt with
two countries, Belgium and Switzerland. Belgium was selected after a pilot study
showed that the level of human rights respect was perceived to be similar to that
in Switzerland. Two national contexts were studied in order to assess a possible
ingroup favoritism effect such that participants would condemn more strongly
violations occurring in a national context other than their own (Moghaddam
and Vuksanovic, 1990). Participants were asked to answer some personal ques-
tions concerning their age, gender, nationality, and school section in order to
become familiar with the computerized procedure. The second experimental vari-
able was then introduced. Respondents were informed that they were to judge
succinctly described scenarios that occurred in one of the two mentioned coun-
tries. The label of the randomly selected country remained visible on the top of the
screen.
Three short vignettes describing a violation of a right were presented in
random order (see Table III). Respondents were invited to provide three words
or phrases summarizing their first reaction toward the presented violation. Sub-
sequently, they were asked to judge each scenario (which remained visible on
the screen) on four dimensions, by clicking their answer on a seven-point scale:
acceptability of the violation committed by authorities (1: acceptable, 7: unac-
ceptable), acceptability of the victim’s act (1: acceptable, 7: unacceptable), and
link to the human rights issue (1: no link at all, 7: very much linked). Finally,
words previously generated by participants were retrieved and presented on the
screen. For each word or expression, they were instructed to indicate whether it
was positive, negative, neutral, or whether it referred to a question.
Table III. News Items and Human Right Issues Used in Study 2
News item 1: No interference with privacy
Without a warrant, the police searched a person’s home. Police suspected the person of drug
trafficking.
Violation of human right: Home search without a warrant (Art. 12 UDHR: see Table I)
News item 2: Free elementary schooling
A local council suppressed the free primary schooling for handicapped children. The council
considered that these children should attend a particular school.
Violation of human right: Suppression of free schooling (Art. 26.1 UDHR: see Table I)
News item 3: Political asylum
The government has denied the right to asylum to a political opponent from Algeria by
arguing that his life was not really in danger in his home country.
Violation of human right: Refusal of asylum (Art. 14.1 UDHR: see Table I).
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In the second part, the rights corresponding to the violations occurring in
the previously described scenarios were shown on the screen, again in random
order, phrased in the official language of the UDHR. Participants were invited to
indicate to what degree they agreed with each right on a seven-point scale (1: no
agreement at all, 7: full agreement). The last part of the questionnaire involved a
recall task in order to determine whether participants associated each scenario with
the corresponding human right. Each scenario was broken up into two sentences,
one containing the request or the act of the victim and the other the rights violation.
The six sentences were presented simultaneously to the participants who were
instructed to match the sentences and the corresponding right.
Results
Spontaneous Expressions Triggered by the Scenarios
Words and phrases expressed as reactions to the scenarios were analyzed
by examining the valence (positive, negative, or neutral) ascribed to them. Par-
ticipants labeled more words as negative (M = 4.11) than neutral (M = 2.28)
or positive (M = 1.40). Words appearing at least three times (N = 102) were
analyzed with the technique of automatic textual analysis (ALCESTE, Reinert,
1986) in order to detect lexical categories. The analysis revealed four categories
with a level of association with the category of p < .10 (X2(1) > 2.90). In the
first category, decisions made by authorities were assimilated with just sanctions
(words labeled as positive by the participants), whereas in two other categories
these decisions were considered violations of rights or personal liberties (negative
words). The last category contained references to doubts about the lawfulness of
the decisions (neutral words). A word labeled as positive was associated with a
context-oriented judgment and a negative one with a rights-oriented judgment.
In order to confirm this result, participants were categorized into two groups on
the basis of the valence ascribed to their responses. Respondents who labeled at
least three words as negative for each positive word were classified as oriented by
a rights-based principle. Remaining participants were classified as oriented by a
context-based principle. The examination of the most frequently cited words by
these two groups provides support for this classification (see Table IV). This cate-
gorization (rights- vs. context-based principle) was then retained as an independent
variable for subsequent analyses.
Association Between Human Rights and Scenarios
In the recall task, participants associated the violation of each scenario with
the corresponding human right 85% (privacy), 84% (free schooling), and 80%
(asylum) of the time. No experimental variable affected these results.
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Table IV. Most Cited Words by Rights- and Context-Oriented Participants
Principle
Words Rights (n = 51) Context (n = 35) Total
Unjust/unfair (−) 46 19 65
Abnormal (−) 24 8 32
Racism/discrimination (−) 13 1 14
Illegal (−) 10 4 14
Violation (−) 7 2 9
Egoism (−) 5 2 7
Normal (+) 6 22 28
Fair (+) 1 20 21
Good decision (+) 2 13 15
Money (0) 5 3 8
Law (0) 4 3 7
Why (0) 4 3 7
Note: Valence of each word is indicated in parentheses.
Judgments of Human Rights as Principles and as Concrete Violations
The principle-application gap was demonstrated by the comparison between
acceptability judgments of violations and the degree of agreement with the corre-
sponding rights. Adherence to the institutionally defined right (all M > 5.83) was
always stronger than the denunciation of its concrete violation (all M < 5.55; all
t(85) > 5.29; all p < .0001). The national context (Belgium vs. Switzerland) had
no effect on these judgments.
Judgments of Concrete Violations
The actions of the victims were positively judged for the scenarios involving
free schooling (M = 1.97) and asylum seeking (M = 3.10). Only the drug dealer
was negatively evaluated (M = 6.38), so the dilemma between the violation of
the right and the rejection of the victim was strongest in this situation.
Judgments of violations were submitted to a 2 (reference: News vs. Human
rights) × 2 (principle: rights-based vs. context-based orientation) analysis of
variance with the agreement with the corresponding human right principle and the
victim’s unacceptability judgment as covariates (see Table V). National context,
sex, and school section of participants had no effect on results and were not further
analyzed.
For all scenarios, unacceptability judgments of the victim covaried negatively
with the condemnation of the violation (search without warrant: (F (1, 85) = 4.35;
p < .05) free schooling: (F (1, 85) = 22.16; p < .001) and refusal of asylum:
(F (1, 85) = 30.44;p < .001). Agreement with the relevant human rights principle
increased the condemnation of the violation in the “search without a warrant”
scenario only (F (1, 85) = .60; p < .001).
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Table V. Mean Condemnation of the Violations by Reference (Study Frame) and
Principle Orientation
Reference Principle
News Right Rights Context
Human right violation (n = 44) (n = 42) (n = 51) (n = 35)
Home-search without warrant 5.07 4.19 5.20 3.83
Suppression of free schooling 5.57 5.60 6.00 4.97
Refusal of asylum 4.48 4.86 5.06 4.09
Note: Scale: 1: acceptable; 7: unacceptable.
Analyses revealed a main effect of the frame of reference on the condemnation
of search without warrant (F (1, 85) = 3.97; p < .05), indicating stronger denun-
ciation when the scenario was framed in terms of news items rather than human
rights. For all scenarios, a rights-oriented judgment principle induced a stronger
condemnation than a context-oriented principle. The difference reached an accept-
able level of statistical significance for search without warrant (F (1, 85) = 5.97;
p < .05) and refusal of asylum (F (1, 85) = 5.34; p < .05). For the suppression
of free schooling, the effect was less clearcut (F (1, 85) = 2.77; p < .10). An
interaction effect between Reference and Principle was observed for the refusal
of asylum scenario (F (1, 85) = 5.32; p < .05). A post hoc multiple comparison
(Tukey test) shows that condemnation of the violation was stronger in the rights-
based orientation than in the context-based orientation only in the News condition
(respectively, Ms = 5.07 and 3.53; p < .05). In the Human rights condition, the
difference was not significant (Ms = 5.04 and 4.61 respectively).
Discussion
The analysis of spontaneous expressions associated with the three violations
revealed lexical categories illustrating various representations manifested in this
setting. Reactions did not differ much according to the type of scenario, which
suggests that participants used similar criteria for assessing different events. Some
of them solved the dilemmas by denouncing violations of rights whereas others
expressed their agreement with the authority’s interventions. We therefore propose
that the former refer their judgments to a normative universe largely influenced by
the human rights idea that is chiefly characterized by the inalienability of rights
(rights-oriented principle), whereas the latter put forth a conception of justice
benefiting authorities at the expense of particular individuals, especially those
deemed to be undeserving (context-oriented principle). This latter conception
is therefore instrumental to the justification of an existing social order and its
authorities.
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The analysis of the unacceptability judgments of the scenarios directly con-
firmed that condemnation of concrete violations was less consensual than ad-
herence to institutionally defined rights. This result provides evidence for the
principle-application gap, and suggests that whereas concrete dilemmas were in-
terpreted with a great deal of variation, general rights principles were accepted on
the basis of a consensually shared positive, yet abstract meaning.
Inspection of response variation about condemnation of violations supports
the general conjecture bearing on the differentiated activation of references to hu-
man rights in the judgments. First, the more participants associated words labeled
as negative to the scenarios, the stronger their denunciation of the violations. Such
a reaction was based on a principle that dissociates the judgment of a human rights
violation from the actions perpetrated by the victims of the violation. This result
offers support for the hypothesis that the judgment of the scenarios was anchored
either in a rights- or in a context-based orientation.
Second, the impact of the frame of reference replicated the results of the first
study when the dilemma was most intense, that is, for the drug dealer situation in
which the violation of the right and the act of the victim were both clearly rejected.
Although the data did not support the hypothesis that the News reference would
increase the activation of a rights-oriented principle in all instances, it must never-
theless be emphasized that the strongest denunciation of the violation is observed
in the News condition for participants holding a rights-based orientation. The
strong effect of the rights- and context-oriented principles could be explained by a
self-generation effect (Greenwald, 1980), which occurs when internally generated
information exerts a robust anchoring effect (Mussweiler and Strack, 1999). On
the other hand, externally provided information (e.g., through priming) should
exert a weaker impact on judgments.
CONCLUSION
As illustrated in interviews reported by Bechlivanou and colleagues (1990)
and Doise (2002), laypersons define rights not by strictly applying principles that
they endorse, but by focusing on the normality of acts committed by individuals
to which principles need to be applied. They adjust their decisions as a function
of contexts and persons. As discussed in the domain of social rights (Cle´mence
et al., 1994; Gilens, 1999; Staerkle´ et al., 2003), in daily life justice cannot be
achieved without taking into account the perceived deservingness of the actors
(Feather, 1999). Individuals not only reject the universality of rights, which is
seen as a source of misuse, but also their restrictive application, which is seen as
a cause of exclusion. If one fundamental principle of institutional justice dealing
with the rights of the accused is the presumption of innocence, in common sense
thinking the non-condemnation of a culprit is as unjust as the condemnation of
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an innocent person (Skitka and Houston, 2002). This is why the unconditional
granting of equal rights to all is considered intolerable.
In the present study, we examined how human rights become disconnected
from formal justice norms when they are analyzed from the point of view of
representational everyday thinking. As our findings suggest, the variations in
responses are regulated by two normative principles described as rights-based and
context-based orientations. This is illustrated by the disparity between participants
who denounced institutional misbehaviors as concrete human rights violations
(following a rights-oriented principle) and those who on the contrary analyzed
them as fair sanctions taken against deviant groups or individuals (following a
context-oriented principle). From the point of view of a rights-based orientation,
whether an act is considered a human rights violation does not depend on the
characteristics of the victim. Rights-based thinking is oriented by the interpretation
of the violation with reference to inalienable human rights, in which case people are
normatively induced to condemn the violation independently of its context. When
following a context-oriented principle, however, we have a tendency to connect our
judgment of a violation to our evaluation of the victim of this violation (e.g., his or
her acts or personal characteristics), resulting in a redefinition of the situation: the
violation becomes a legitimate sanction of an unacceptable act. The violation is
dissociated from a reference to rights and approached from the perspective of the
(unacceptable) action of the victims; as a consequence, the gravity of the human
rights violation is minimized.
Apparently, participants reserve references to human rights for important
issues or for massive violations that rarely occur in their daily environments.
Media reports largely facilitate such anchoring as they emphasize the human
rights dimension of wars, torture, and the lack of freedom occurring in remote
and unfamiliar settings. This view of human rights renders them distant and quite
irrelevant to everyday life matters, at least in Western countries. On the other hand,
in local and familiar contexts, media easily insist on the necessity and the fairness
of sanctions of socially unacceptable acts, even when these sanctions are clear
human rights violations. This is how it can be understood that when misbehaviors
committed by authorities in familiar and proximal contexts are framed as human
rights violations, they may paradoxically seem distant and irrelevant to everyday
life, and trigger “not-my-problem” and “blame-the-victim” attitudes (Lerner and
Goldberg, 1999). Reference to news items, on the other hand, may make events
seem “closer,” thereby facilitating the dissociation between violations and acts of
the victim, as these events could happen in close proximity as well. Under these
conditions, rights violations become less acceptable.
This “news item effect” could explain the recent reactions towards the U.S.
treatment of prisoners in Iraq and the Guantanamo Bay camp. Before major news-
papers revealed these mistreatments, most people (including members of the elite)
presumably shared the point of view that the prisoners were dangerous people who
must have committed highly reprehensible acts. Therefore, it would be justified
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if they were not to be protected by human rights conventions. Such a judgment,
typically reflecting a context-based principle, was apparently impervious to the
repeated declarations made by important international organizations (e.g., the Red
Cross) who reported the human rights violations. However, the diffusion of crude
pictures in the media very quickly created a new, rights-oriented frame, which was
adopted by a large number of citizens in the U.S. and elsewhere. The condemna-
tion of the inhumane treatment of the prisoners has not suppressed the rejection of
their acts. Instead, these two phenomena were dissociated. As a result, most people
accepted that prisoners deserve the application of human rights principles and the
protection of international legal conventions, no matter what the circumstances
were that brought them into the prisons. This rapid and massive shift in public and
elite opinion provides a dramatic illustration of how context- and rights-oriented
principles of judgment can be activated by media reports, thereby shaping attitudes
toward human rights violations.
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